I develop a stylized partial on-the-job equilibrium search model which incorporate a spatial dimension. Workers reside on a circle and can move at a cost. Each point on the circle has a wage distribution. Implications about wages and job mobility are drawn from the model and tested on Danish matched employer-employee data. The model predictions hold true. I …nd that workers working farther away from their residence earn higher wages. When a worker is making a job-to-job transition where he changes workplace location he experiences a higher wage change than a worker making a job-to-job transition without changing workplace location.
Introduction
Worker's individual location choice of residence and job are closely interdependent. However, most studies of job mobility and wages do not take into account the location of the worker's residence relative to the location of the job. Almost all literature using structural search models ignore the joint decision of workplace and residential location taken by the worker. This paper provides a theoretical on-the-job search model incorporating a spatial dimension, hereby allowing the worker to consider locational choices. The model implications are tested on a Danish employer-employee data set and hold true for almost all speci…cations.
There exists a small but increasing literature on search models with spatial features. Brueckner and Zenou (2003) use a minimum wage framework and an e¢ ciency wage framework in order to explain the spatial mismatch hypothesis, i.e., the fact that black workers reside in segregated zones which are distant and poorly connected to major centers of growth. In their model black workers use less land to live on, and therefore have steeper bid-rent curves which initially locates them near the Central Business District (CBD) of the linear city. If a Suburban Business District emerges at the other end of the linear city, then black workers would move there, but if they are discriminated against and therefore cannot, then they will continue to live near the city center and experience higher unemployment. The higher unemployment is caused by black workers having a harder time …nding employment because of the increased distance to jobs. Smith and Zenou (2003) , Zenou (2009) and Zenou (2010) use a monocentric circular model in order to describe a joint equilibrium of employed and unemployed workers and residential location.
All three papers build on the idea of a CBD in which all employed workers are working. However, none of the papers include on-the-job search and are therefore incapable of relating job-to-job transitions and wages. Nagypal (2005) demonstrates that job-to-job transitions are very common and it is therefore important to understand how they interact with residential decisions. This paper contributes in this direction. Van Ommeren et al. (2000) derive an on-the-job search model where workers search both for a job and a residential location. Jobs have two characteristics; a wage and a commuting distance, while residences also consist of two characteristics; a place utility and a commuting distance. However, there is no notion of space directly in the model, so jobs are not tied to a speci…c location, i.e., the notion of cities with better job o¤er distributions cannot be analyzed 2 in this framework.
Numerous empirical studies have shown that commuting time is positively related to job and residential mobility, see Van Ommeren (2000) , Clark, Huang, and Withers (2003) , Manning (2003) , and Clark and Huang (2004) . Madden and Chiu (1990) investigate whether or not di¤erences in commuting times between men and women can explain the gender wage gap. They …nd little evidence of this among both white and black, two wage-earner households. Timothy and Wheaton (2001) …nd that there is up to 15-20 percent di¤erences in wages between suburban locations and the city center within the same metropolitan area (Boston and Minneapolis) controlling for a wide range of individual characteristics. But there are also large variations between di¤erent suburban areas. Madden and Chiu also …nd a positive relationship between average wages in an area and the average commuting time for workers working within that area. Hourly compensation for commuting times is 1.6 to 3 times the wage rate, which could be consistent with a worker valuing commuting time and work time the same and having commuting costs as high or a little higher than hourly wages.
Most studies of individual wage dynamics …nd that about 30-50 percent of job-to-job transitions are followed by a wage decrease, see e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) . Standard search models cannot explain this observation. Several explanations have been proposed to solve the apparent paradox. One way to deal with negative wage jumps has been to allow for the possibility of measurement error in wages. However, this is not satisfying in the sense that the measurement error has to be unreasonably large in order to generate the observed pattern in the data. Dey and Flinn (2005) incorporate health insurance into a search and matching framework thereby allowing …rms to have two attributes, the wage and the provision of health insurance. A worker who demands health insurance is willing to take a wage cut in order to move to a …rm which o¤ers health insurance.
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) introduce an alternating o¤er game between employers over the workers, i.e., the incumbent …rm are allowed to make counter o¤ers when an employed worker meets a new …rm. One of the central implications of this model is that workers are willing to take wage cuts when moving between …rms, since being at a high productivity …rm increases later wage gains from the alternating o¤ers game. Finally, Taber and Vejlin (2010) encompass compensating di¤erentials into a search model and show that non-pecuniary …rm attributes are important and can generate job-to-job transitions with a wage cut. This paper suggests a new explanation of why job-to-job transitions so often are followed by a wage decrease. The hypothesis is that workers moving to a job closer to their residential location potentially are willing to take a wage cut. They are willing to do this in order to save the cost of transportation between the workplace and the residence. This can be seen as a compensating di¤erential due to transportation costs, but it is not modelled explicitly in Taber and Vejlin (2010) . This paper develops a simple partial equilibrium search model where workers live on a circle and residential moves are costly. Each point on the circle has a wage distribution. Jobs get exogenously destroyed, and workers get job o¤ers both when employed and unemployed. Thus, the workers spend their lives cycling between employment and unemployment. Residential moves are endogenized. The model holds particular predictions about the link between wages, residential choice, workplace choice, and mobility. These are tested on a matched Danish employer-employee data set. None of the empirical studies of locational choices mentioned above explicitly study wage changes in the analysis. Thus, one of the main contributions of this paper is to investigate the level of accepted wages for workers following a job-to-job transition. An interesting pattern emerges which is consistent with the model. Workers making a job-to-job transition in a given year have higher wage increases than workers who stay at their current job. This is a standard …nding and it is in accordance with basic search models. However, following a job-to-job transition, workers who change work location to a di¤erent county have higher wage increases than workers making a job-to-job transition within the same county. Perhaps even more interesting, workers moving to a workplace closer to their residence on average experience a wage drop. This provides a credible new explanation of the frequently observed wage drops following job-to-job transitions. I also …nd that job-to-job transitions associated with the highest wage increases are those where both work location and residential location are changed. Finally, I …nd that low wage workers and workers who have a large distance between workplace and residence are more likely to make a job-to-job transition.
This also holds for a joint job-to-job transition and a residential move. All the empirical …ndings in the paper support the model and suggests that locational considerations are important for workers when deciding about taking a job o¤er.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 the model is presented and analyzed. The data used is presented in section 3. In section 4 I present the results and …nally, in section 5 I conclude. 4 
Model
In this section I develop a stylized, partial on-the-job equilibrium search model in which workers live on a circle and where each point on the circle has a wage distribution. Workers get …red at an exogenous rate and can …nd new jobs both when employed and unemployed. So far, circular models have primarily been used in the search literature when investigating sorting between workers and …rms, see e.g. Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Gautier, van Vuuren and Teulings (2010).
Circular model
Workers are living on a circle with circumference 1, but they can move at a cost, c. Jobs are exogenously located on the circle and are characterized by a wage, w, and a location, l. The joint o¤er distribution of wages and locations is given by F (w; l) with w(l) and w(l) being the lowest and the highest wages at location l, respectively. The value of being employed in a job at location l, at a wage w, and living at location h is given by the asset value equation
0; W (x; h; y) W (w; h; l);
W (x; y; y) c W (w; h; l)
where t( ) is the transportation cost which is increasing and convex, d(l; h) is the distance between h and l, de…ned as
. is the job destruction rate, and is the arrival rate of job o¤ers. The worker basically has three options when a job o¤er arrives. First, he can reject the o¤er. Second, he can accept the o¤er and choose not to move. And third, he can accept the o¤er and chose to move. In order to make the model as simple as possible, I only allow the worker to move to the location of the new job. For some distributions of F the worker might want to move to a di¤erent location than that of the new job, e.g. if it is highly likely that he will later …nd a job there later. This is assumed not to be an option for the worker, and corresponds to assuming that the distribution of wages are not too di¤erent between locations su¢ ciently close to one another.
5
The value of being unemployed is given by the asset value equation
I assume that the unemployed worker has no transportation cost, so being unemployed is the same as being employed at location h at a wage b. Since the job o¤er arrival rate is independent of the location of the worker, the unemployed worker will never move.
Analysis
The question is in what regions of the joint distribution of w; h; and l the worker wants to take which actions. The worker basically has three options when getting a job o¤er, 1) he can reject the o¤er and stay in his current state, 2) he can accept the o¤er and not move residential location, or 3) he can accept the o¤er and move to the new location at a cost c. In order to analyze when he wants to take which action, I break the decision down into three sub-scenarios where he only has two choices.
Let us …rst have a closer look at when the employed worker is indi¤erent between rejecting a job o¤er and accepting the job, but not moving residential location. One can show that the reservation wage e w 1 at location e l 1 is given by 1
This equality implicitly de…nes the set ( e w 1 ; e l 1 ) for which the worker is indi¤erent. If there are no di¤erence between the search technologies while employed and unemployed, the worker only has to be compensated for his higher or lower transport costs. If the new job is closer to home than the current job, the worker is willing to accept a wage decrease in order to save transportation costs.
We now turn to the set of ( e w 2 ; e l 2 ) for which the worker is indi¤erent between accepting the job 1 See Appendix 6 o¤er and staying and accepting the job o¤er and moving to location e l. One can show that 2 
It is easy to see that the term under the integral is greater than zero since W ( e w 2 ; e l 2 ; e l 2 ) > W ( e w 2 ; h; e l 2 ).
From equation 2 one can see that the higher the cost of moving, the higher the transportation cost, t(d( e l 2 ; h)), can be before the worker wants to move. Also, the higher the job destruction rate, the higher is the transportation cost the worker is willing to endure since the expected duration of the job is smaller. Likewise the higher the job …nding rate is, the less likely the worker is to move, since he will …nd a job closer to his current home at a higher rate.
Finally, we need to …nd out for which set of ( e w 3 ; e l 3 ) the worker is indi¤erent between rejecting the job o¤er and accepting the job o¤er and moving. One can show that the worker is indi¤erent 
+ f
max(0; W (x; h; y) W (w; h; l); W (x; y; y) c W (w; h; l)) max(0; W (x; e l 3 ; y) W (w; h; l) c; W (x; y; y) 2c W (w; h; l))dF (x; y)g
Notice that the term inside the integral is larger than zero. The wage di¤erence has to compensate the worker for the cost of moving minus the saved transportation cost. The higher the job o¤er arrival rate, the higher the wage di¤erence between the current and the new job has to be, since a higher job o¤er arrival rate implies a higher probability of …nding a better job closer to the current home. The lower the wage in the current job, the higher is the probability of moving residential location.
Let us look at a special case, where the decision between rejecting the job o¤er and accepting the job o¤er and moving. This is the case since the option value of getting a new job does not depend on the location of the current job.
Likewise, for the decision between accepting the job o¤er at a wage e w 3 at location e l 3 and accepting the job o¤er and moving to location, e l 3 does not depend on e w 3 . For this special case one can draw this graphical illustration of the decisions of the worker from equation 1, 2, and 3. This is done in …gure 1 4 . 
Model predictions
From equation 1 we can see that for those workers who change job but do not move the reservation wage is only higher than the current wage if the new job is further away from home than the old job. The increase in reservation wage takes place because a worker who does not change residential location only receives compensation for the added transportation costs, i.e., the further away the place of work is from the residence, the higher the realize wage increase should be for job-to-job 4 The proof of why the lines intersect is in the Appendix and are derived using reveal preferences.
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transitions. If the job is closer to home, the reservation wage is lower than the current wage, and the worker might even experience an average wage decrease. Turning to equation 2 we see that workers with a given wage level are more likely to move the higher their current transportation costs are. Higher transportation costs make the worker lower his reservation wage, since potentially he could save the cost by moving to a new job location. Looking at equation 3 one can see that the lower the current wage, the higher is the probability of moving both job and residence. This is the case since the worker has to amortize the cost of moving, which only pays o¤ if the wage increase is large. We also see that the further away from home one is working, the higher is the probability of making a residential move. This is because the reservation wage for moving is e¤ectively lowered by higher transportation costs, which can be saved if the worker moves. Also the wage in the new job should not depend on the location of the job, i.e., the wage increase for those that move should not depend on how far away they move. Looking at …gure 1 one notices that those who change job and move have higher wage increases than those who just change jobs without moving. This is so since moving is only a valid option if the wage is really high.
Data
The data used in the empirical analysis is that of the Danish register-based matched employeremployee data set IDA covering the period 1985 to 2003. 5 IDA contains annual socioeconomic information on workers and background information on employers, and it covers the entire Danish population. For the last week in November we observe the worker. If he is working, we observe in which …rm and at which workplace he is employed. The data also contains earnings information which consists of the annual average hourly wage in the job occupied in the last week of November.
In order to be clear a …rm potentially consists of multiple workplaces, while a workplace can only belong to one …rm. The distinction is important for the following de…nition of job-to-job transitions. Importantly, the data also contains information on the municipality of residence and of the workplace. These are the variables used to proxy locational choices. The data set is merged with detailed spell data on individual labor market histories.
The spell data consists of a worker and an employer id, start and end date of the spell, a variable 
Sample Selection
I disregard workers with invalid information, such as gaps in their spell history. These constitute only a very small number of individuals (less than one percent). Next, I de…ne labor market entry to be the month of graduation from the highest completed education recorded in the data. 6 I delete observations before this date. If the worker is observed in education after the date of highest completed education, the worker is disregarded. For instance, workers who attend college but whose highest completed education is high school are deleted from the data since their highest education is high school but they still are observed in education (college). Notice, that if these workers had completed college, then their highest education would have been college and not high school and so they would not have been deleted. I also censor workers when they turn 55 years. This is done The second set uses the distance in kilometers (km) between the workplace municipality and the residential municipality. 7 In the second sample I study mobility patterns of workers. More speci…cally, I study job-tojob transitions and job-to-job transitions jointly with a residential move. I have therefore limited the sample to employed workers who have been employed for two consecutive years without being non-employed in between. This limits the sample to 17.743.917 observations. The two dependent variables are whether or not the worker is making a job-to-job transition between two years and if he is making a job-to-job transition jointly with a residential move. A job-to-job transition is de…ned as a move between two …rms within a year where the worker has not been non-employed.
The variables of interest are the wage and the two sets of proxies for distance between workplace and residence. Finally, the last sample is for estimating wage growth between two years for individuals making a job-to-job transition. The sample is therefore a sub-sample of the previous, i.e., I limit the sample to employed workers that have been employed for two consecutive years without being non-employed in between and have made a job-to-job transition. This limits the sample to 2.464.489
observations. The dependent variable is going to be yearly wage changes. There are going to be 7 The distance is calculated from the center of one municipality to the center of the other.
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three independent key variables. The …rst pertains to whether or not the old and the new workplace are located in di¤erent municipalities. The secondly delineates whether the worker changed from a workplace outside the residential county to one inside it. And the third regards whether or not the worker changed both workplace county and residential county.
Results
This section reviews whether predictions made by the theoretical model hold in the data. The …rst subsection relates to wage levels, the second to mobility patterns, and the third relates to the predictions regarding wage changes when making transitions in the labor and residential markets.
Wage Regression
According to the theory put forward, workers working farther away from home should on average have higher wages. This is due to compensating di¤erentials in the sense that a worker do not accept low wage jobs if these are located far away from his current residential location. In table   2 the results from an OLS regression of log wages on two di¤erent sets of measures of distance between the workers workplace and his residential location are reported.
[ Insert table 2 here]
The regressions are performed both with and without covariates and with and without residential and workplace municipality …xed e¤ects and worker …xed e¤ects. First, looking at the regressions using whether or not the workplace and the residence are in di¤erent municipalities and counties, I
…nd that both coe¢ cients on the proxies of distance are positive and signi…cant and rather large.
We can see that they drop when we start to control for individual heterogeneity and …xed e¤ects.
But even controlling for individual heterogeneity does not eliminate the wage premium. Living and working in di¤erent municipalities, but not in di¤erent counties, is associated with a wage premium of 1.2 percent, while living and working in di¤erent counties is associated with a wage premium of 2.4 percent. So the farther away from home one is working, the higher is the wage premium. Using the average commuting distance between workplace and residential municipalities gives similar results. For all levels of distance, increasing the distance, increases the wage premium.
Workers commuting more than 60 km earn on average 3.4 % more than those living and working the in the same municipality.
This is in accordance with the theory of increased reservation wages due to increased transportation costs. As already mentioned in the introduction, the fact the commuting time is positively related to wages is widely established in the literature already, e.g., see Timothy and Wheaton (2001) . In order to compare the estimate, I will need to do some calculations. As an example let us take a worker with a commuting distance of 17.5 km. If we assume an eight hour work day and that the worker spends 1 hour transporting himself 60 km, then the value-of-time of commuting is 8 0:013 35=60 = 0:178 times the wage rate. This is a lot smaller than Timothy and Wheaton (2001) who report estimates of 1.6 to 3. However, their estimates also include direct money expenses of commuting. Miller (1989) also reports estimates below the value of 1. Looking at the development of the estimates over the di¤erent speci…cations one should also notice that they drop to a tenth of the original estimate suggesting that controlling for individual heterogeneity and …xed e¤ects are very important. Using the raw estimate from the data I get the results that the value-of-time of commuting is 1:7 times the wage rate thus suggesting that the current value-of-time of commuting is somewhat upward biased.
Job-to-Job Transitions
The model also relates the level of wages with the probability of making a job-to-job transition.
The lower the current wage, the higher the probability of making a job-to-job transition and a job-to-job transition jointly with a residential move. The intuition in both cases is simply that the reservation wage is smaller both for a job-to-job transition and for a job-to-job transition jointly with a residential move. Since low wage individuals have lower reservation wages they accept more job o¤ers. Empirically the question is in what way one would de…ne the current wage. Taking the model to the extreme, all workers are ex ante homogenous and therefore comparable. However, most workers are not homogenous and taking heterogeneity into account seems to be a good idea.
The most straight forward way to do this is to control for individual covariates and worker …xed e¤ects while still including the wage. The coe¢ cient on wages is going to re ‡ect the e¤ect of wages conditional on observed characteristics, i.e., if a worker earns a high wage given his education, position in the …rm, experience etc. If the coe¢ cient is negative, this means that a high wage worker 13 conditional on observed characteristics has a lower probability of making a job-to-job transition, which would be in accordance with the theory. Table 3 shows the results for the probability of making a job-to-job transition.
[ Insert table 3 here] Just regressing on wages yields a small positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient on wages. However, after controlling for individual characteristics one can see that higher paid workers have a lower probability of making a job-to-job transition just as outlined in the model. This probably re ‡ects the fact the high ability workers have both higher wages and are more likely to switch jobs. After controlling for both covariates and the …xed e¤ects, the coe¢ cient on log wages is minus 0.051. The standard deviation of wages is 0.38, so a one standard deviation increase in wages leads to a 1.9
percentage point drop in the probability of making a job-to-job transition in a given year. This is a rather large e¤ect, since the probability of making a job-to-job transition is 13.9 percent.
I now turn to the probability of making a job-to-job transition jointly with a residential move in table 3. According to the model, workers with a high wage would make less frequent residential moves since they have higher reservation wages. Therefore they need a really high wage o¤er in order to be willing to pay the moving cost c. This is con…rmed in table 3 where all the coe¢ cients on wages across di¤erent speci…cations are negative ranging from minus 0.007 to 0. In the speci…cation with both worker …xed e¤ects and covariates the e¤ect is minus 0.006. At …rst this might seem like a small e¤ect, but keep in mind that the probability that a worker makes a job-to-job transition jointly with a residential move is less than one percent per year.
The model also related distance between the current job and residence to the probability of making a job-to-job transition. Speci…cally, workers with large distance between workplace and residence should have a higher probability of making a job-to-job transition. This is driven by the fact that higher transportation costs are going to e¤ectively lower the reservation wage of the worker, thereby making him accept job o¤ers more frequently. This holds both for workers who only make job-to-job transitions and workers who make a joint job-to-job transition with a residential move. Table 4 shows the results from an OLS regression of the probability of making a job-to-job transition on the two di¤erent sets of proxies for distance between residence and workplace.
[ Insert table 4 here] 14
In all speci…cations of the model living and working in di¤erent municipalities is associated with a higher probability of making a job-to-job transition. The results vary from 2.1 to 3.2 percent.
Controlling for individual heterogeneity in the form of covariates and worker …xed e¤ects makes the estimates smaller. However, they are still relatively large and strongly signi…cant. In the regression where both individual time varying covariates and worker …xed e¤ects are taken into account, the e¤ect is 2.1 percent. This is a very high e¤ect since an average of 14 percent of the workers make a job-to-job transition each year. If the workplace and the residence are located in di¤erent counties, then the probability is even higher ranging from 6.8 to 4.0 percent. This means that a relatively large proportion of the job-to-job transitions we observe are driven by factors in ‡uenced by spatial considerations. If everyone worked in the municipality in which they live, job-to-job transitions would fall by 4 percentage points compared to a world were everyone work and live in di¤erent counties. Turning to the second set of proxies, i.e., the measure of commuting distance, I …nd that for almost all speci…cations there is an increasing probability of making a job-to-job transition as the distance increases. It is reassuring to see that not only working and living in di¤erent municipalities have an e¤ect, but also that the proxies for increasing distance are positive. After controlling for both covariates and the …xed e¤ects, we can see that a worker who works more than 60 km away from home has a 9.3 percentage point higher probability of making a job-to-job transition compared to a worker working in his residential municipality. Table 5 contains the estimates when regressing a job-to-job transition jointly with a residential move on proxies for the distance between residence and workplace location.
[Insert table 5 here]
The results here are a little mixed. The e¤ect of living and working in di¤erent counties on the propensity to make a residential move jointly with a job-to-job transition are positive. However, when the workplace and residential locations are in di¤erent municipalities, the e¤ect is actually reversed. Turning to the proxies of commuting distance the pattern is somewhat con…rmed. At low distances the results are a little fuzzy. However, when the distance becomes more than 40 km, then there is a much higher probability. One explanations for these …ndings is that a short commuting distance does not e¤ect the probability to move. However, once the distance between workplace and residence becomes su¢ ciently high, then the worker takes this aspect into consideration.
Wage Changes
According to the structural model presented, workers should have a higher wage increase if they made a job-to-job transition which made the distance between the workplace and residential location increase. This happens in the model since workers who accept jobs farther away from home, but do not move, have higher reservation wages, since they want compensation for the increased cost of transportation. On the other hand job-to-job transitions which made the distance between the workplace and residential location smaller would on average have smaller wage increases than jobto-job transitions in general. The wage increase could even turn into a decrease depending on the parameters of the model. The intuition is that worker's reservation wages are lower for job o¤ers near their home since they can save transportation costs. Another prediction was that workers who make a job-to-job transition and move residential location on average get a higher wage increase than those who just make a job-to-job transition without moving residential location, because, for the worker to consider a residential move, which is costly, the job o¤er should be very good. From table 1 one can see that in the raw data those who make job-to-job transitions have on average a higher wage increase of 1.1 percent compared to those who stay with the same employer. Table   6 shows the results from OLS regressions of wage increases between two years. The regression is run only for workers who have made a job-to-job transition between two consecutive years. The main variables of interest are three dummies indicating 1) whether or not the worker has changed workplace county when changing job, 2) whether or not the work county has been changed to the residential county, and …nally 3) whether or not both the work county and the residential county has been changed. The model is estimated in four di¤erent speci…cations, and the coe¢ cients do not change sign between them, although they do change size.
[Insert table 6 here]
The reference group in the estimation consists of workers making a job-to-job transition within their current workplace county. As predicted by the model, making a job-to-job transition where one changes workplace county is associated with a higher wage increase than average. In the raw data the average wage increase is 5.7 percent for individuals making a job-to-job transition. When the job-to-job transition is associated with a change in workplace county the wage increase is on average 0.1 to 1 percent higher depending on which speci…cation used. This is a relatively high e¤ect. However, if the workplace is changing from outside to inside the residential county, then the wage actually decreases. This conclusion also holds over all speci…cations. The combined e¤ect is approximately a wage decrease of 1.5 percent. Notice that this is consistent with the model, although the model cannot label the sign of the wage change when moving closer to home since there are two di¤erent forces at work. The worker is willing to accept a wage cut, but on the other hand the wage o¤er is random and he might also draw a high o¤er. However, in the regression there is a substantial wage drop following a job-to-job transition changing the workplace from outside to inside the residential county. From table 1 one can see that 12 percent of all job-to-job transitions are of this kind. Thus, compensating di¤erentials in the form of transportation costs seems to o¤er a potential explanation for the fact that a substantial part of job-to-job transitions are associated with a wage decrease, which is contradicted by standard search models. Finally, the last prediction by the model was that workers who jointly make a job-to-job transition and a residential move have the highest wage increases on average, because workers reject low wage o¤ers from jobs that require them to move since they need to be compensated for the cost of moving residence. This is also con…rmed by table 6. If the worker is both making a job-to-job transition to a di¤erent county and is moving to a di¤erent county, this is associated with an even higher wage premium than if only the workplace county is changed. The wage increase is on average 0.5 to 4.6 percent higher than for workers not changing workplace county. So all three predictions about wage changes seems to hold in the data.
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a simple way of incorporating a spatial dimension into a standard partial on-
the-job search model in order to understand the joint decision of workplace location and residential location. The model o¤ers a lot of predictions which are tested using Danish data. I …nd that workers with higher distances between home and workplace tend to earn higher wages. In the model this is due to higher reservation wages for workplace locations farther away from home. I …nd the timevalue of commuting time to approximately 0.2 times the wage rate. This is substantially lower than previous estimates from the literature. I …nd that controlling extensively for individual heterogeneity leads to much lower e¤ects, suggesting that the higher timevalue of commuting time estimated in the literature could be due to the fact that studies use less control variables, see e.g.
Timothy and Wheaton (2001)
. Speci…cally, using within worker variation seems to be important.
The model also puts forward predictions regarding the propensity to make job-to-job transitions.
The probability of making a job-to-job transition and a job-to-job transition jointly with a residential move is highest for low wage workers. Low wage workers simply have lower reservation wages and therefore tend to accept job o¤ers more frequently. Workers who work farther away from home have lower reservation wages since they currently have higher transportation costs. This should theoretically result in more job-to-job transitions. This is also con…rmed if we look at workers working in counties which are not the ones they live in. However, this is not the case for worker's only working in a di¤erent municipality.
Finally, the model holds predictions about the realized wage change when workers made job-tojob transitions. Workers who made a job-to-job transition in which they changed workplace county experienced a higher wage increase than those who do not change workplace county. Again, the model predicts this since the workers who change workplace county have a higher reservation wage, since they need to be compensated for the added transportation costs. However, if the workplace county is changed to the residential county, then the wage increase actually becomes a decrease. This is a new …nding, and potentially one which can help explain why so many job moves are associated with a wage decrease. Finally, workers who experience both a job-to-job transition and a residential move have the highest wage increases on average. This is also predicted by the model since a residential move is costly and therefore has the highest reservation wage.
This paper has thus set up a spatial search model with on-the-job search. The model predictions regarding wage changes and mobility patterns are con…rmed using Danish matched employeremployee data. In future research, it would be interesting to extend this framework in an equilibrium model, thus allowing for policy evaluations of subsidies for transportation, urban structure and the like. However, this is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Derivation of reservation wages and locations
Indi¤erent between rejecting a job o¤er and accepting the job, but not moving residential location
The value of rejecting the job o¤er is just
max(0; W (x; h; y) W (w; h; l); W (x; y; y) c W (w; h; l))dF (x; y) and the value of accepting the job o¤er at a wage e w at location e l, but not moving residence is
rW ( e w; h; e l) = w t(d( e l; h)) (W ( e w; h; e l) U (h))
max(0; W (x; h; y) W ( e w; h; e l); W (x; y; y) c W ( e w; h; e l))dF (x; y)
The worker is indi¤erent when W ( e w; h; e l) = W (w; h; l). I.e.
max(0; W (x; h; y) W (w; h; l); W (x; y; y) c W (w; h; l))dF (x; y) = e w t(d( e l; h)) (W ( e w; h; e l) U (h))
max(0; W (x; h; y) W (w; h; l); W (x; y; y) c W (w; h; l))dF (x; y)
Indi¤erent between accepting the job and accepting the job o¤er and moving to the new location 21
As before the value of accepting the job o¤er at a wage e w at location e l, but not moving residence is rW ( e w; h; e l) = e w t(d( e l; h)) (W ( e w; h; e l) U (h))
while the value living at the new location e l with the new job is rW ( e w; e l; e l) = e w t(d( e l; e l)) (W ( e w; e l; e l) U (h))
max(0; W (x; e l; y) W ( e w; e l; e l); W (x; y; y) c W ( e w; e l; e l))dF (x; y)
The worker is indi¤erent when W ( e w; e l; e l) c = W ( e w; h; e l). I.e. e w t(d( e l; h)) (W ( e w; h; e l) U (h))
max(0; W (x; h; y) W ( e w; h; e l); W (x; y; y) c W ( e w; h; e l))dF (x; y) = e w t(d( e l; e l)) (W ( e w; e l; e l) U (h))
max(0; W (x; e l; y) W ( e w; e l; e l); W (x; y; y) c W ( e w; e l; e l))dF (x; y) rc
max(0; W (x; e l; y) W ( e w; e l; e l); W (x; y; y) c W ( e w; e l; e l))dF (x; y) (r + )c max(0; W (x; h; y) W ( e w; h; e l); W (x; y; y) c W ( e w; h; e l)) max(0; W (x; e l; y) W ( e w; e l; e l); W (x; y; y) c W ( e w; e l; e l))dF (x; y)
It is easy to see that 22
max(0; W (x; h; y) W ( e w; h; e l); W (x; y; y) c W ( e w; h; e l)) max(0; W (x; e l; y) W ( e w; e l; e l); W (x; y; y) c W ( e w; e l; e l))dF (x; y) > 0 since W ( e w; e l; e l) > W ( e w; h; e l).
Indi¤erent between rejecting the job o¤er and accepting the job o¤er and moving
The value of rejecting the job o¤er is de…ned by
The value of accepting the job o¤er at a wage e w at location e l, but not moving residence is de…ned by rW ( e w; e l; e l) = e w t(d( e l; e l)) (W ( e w; e l; e l) U (h))
The worker is indi¤erent when W (w; h; l) = W ( e w; e l; e l) c. I.e. when
max(0; W (x; h; y) W (w; h; l); W (x; y; y) c W (w; h; l))dF (x; y) = e w t(d( e l; e l)) (W ( e w; e l; e l) U (h))
max(0; W (x; e l; y) W ( e w; e l; e l); W (x; y; y) c W ( e w; e l; e l))dF (x; y) rc Tables   27   Table 1 Notes: '*', and '**'indicate signi…cance at one and …ve percent level, respectively. Covariates includes following variabes: Potential experience, potential experience squared, female, dummies for educational level, position in the workplace, type of employer (private, municipal, regional or state), industry, civil status, number of children in di¤erent age groups, and yearly dummies. Fixed e¤ects include …xed e¤ects for residential municipality, workplace municipality and individual …xed e¤ects. Notes: '*', and '**'indicate signi…cance at one and …ve percent level, respectively. Covariates includes following variabes: Potential experience, potential experience squared, female, dummies for educational level, position in the workplace, type of employer (private, municipal, regional or state), industry, civil status, number of children in di¤erent age groups, and yearly dummies. Fixed e¤ects include …xed e¤ects for residential municipality, workplace municipality and individual …xed e¤ects. Notes: '*', and '**'indicate signi…cance at one and …ve percent level, respectively. Covariates includes following variabes: Potential experience, potential experience squared, female, dummies for educational level, position in the workplace, type of employer (private, municipal, regional or state), industry, civil status, number of children in di¤erent age groups, and yearly dummies. Fixed e¤ects include …xed e¤ects for residential municipality, workplace municipality and individual …xed e¤ects. Notes: '*', and '**'indicate signi…cance at one and …ve percent level, respectively. Covariates includes following variabes: Potential experience, potential experience squared, female, dummies for educational level, position in the workplace, type of employer (private, municipal, regional or state), industry, civil status, number of children in di¤erent age groups, and yearly dummies. Fixed e¤ects include …xed e¤ects for residential municipality, workplace municipality and individual …xed e¤ects. Notes: '*', and '**'indicate signi…cance at one and …ve percent level, respectively. Covariates includes following variabes: Potential experience, potential experience squared, female, dummies for educational level, position in the workplace, type of employer (private, municipal, regional or state), industry, civil status, number of children in di¤erent age groups, and yearly dummies. Fixed e¤ects include …xed e¤ects for residential municipality, workplace municipality and individual …xed e¤ects.
